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ACCOMMODATING COMPETITION: HARMONIZING
NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS
JONATHAN B. BAKER*
ABSTRACT
This Article shows how the norm supporting governmental action
to protect and foster competitive markets was harmonized with
economic rights to contract and property during the 19th century,
and with the development of the social safety net during the 20th
century. It explains why the Constitution, as understood today, does
not check the erosion of the entrenched but threatened national
commitment to assuring competitive markets.
* Research Professor of Law, American University Washington College of Law. The
author is indebted to Susan Carle and Alan Meese.
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INTRODUCTION
At two critical moments, the United States worked out ways to
harmonize a national commitment to protect and foster competitive
markets with other deep public commitments affecting economic
regulation. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court con-
fronted the problem of whether a government that is required to
protect contract and property rights could also act to prevent the
exercise of market power.1 Any restraint on a seller’s ability to
charge monopoly prices, after all, would necessarily limit its con-
tractual freedom and constrain how it uses its private property.2
Later, in the mid-twentieth century, the political system had to
reconcile the important public role in assuring competitive markets
with the government’s ability to displace competition in order to
protect the vulnerable.3 This Article will examine those critical mo-
ments, with a focus on the way the legal and political system ac-
commodated the competition norm.
The first of the three public commitments involving economic
regulation, the protection of property and contract rights, is rec-
ognized in the Constitution.4 The other two commitments, to as-
suring competitive markets and to preventing economic hardships
to vulnerable market participants through social insurance and
regulation, lack direct textual support in the Constitution. They
nevertheless have become deeply entrenched norms of the type that
William Eskridge and John Ferejohn refer to as “superstatutory.”5
Accordingly, the nineteenth century harmonization problem re-
quired the Supreme Court to construe the constitutional mandate
for public protection of economic rights so that it would accommo-
date what was then an emerging norm of permitting governmental
1. See infra Part II.
2. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142-43 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting) (stating that
legislative determination of the price that an owner will receive for the use of his property is
the practical equivalent of a deprivation of private property).
3. See infra Part III.
4. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; id. amend. V.
5. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOHN FEREJOHN, A REPUBLIC OF STATUTES: THE NEW
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 16-17 (2010).
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action to protect competition.6 The twentieth century harmonization
problem was worked out by the political system as a whole, not just
the courts, after the Supreme Court accepted that economic rights
did not prevent wide-ranging regulation and redistribution.7
One might think that the judiciary would resolve any conflict be-
tween a constitutionally recognized commitment and a subconsti-
tutional commitment—the harmonization issue that arose during
the nineteenth century—by allowing the former to trump the latter.8
That did not happen. Rather, the commitment to competitive mar-
kets probably had more protection in the courts in the late nine-
teenth century than it does today, after the mid-twentieth century
resolution of the conflict between subconstitutional commitments.9
That is one reason why the public commitment to assuring competi-
tive markets is now endangered.10
Part I of this Article sketches the three entrenched public com-
mitments involving economic regulation. Parts II and III explain
how the commitments were accepted and harmonized in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. Part III also explains why the Con-
stitution does not stand in the way of the erosion of competition
commitment. Part IV concludes with a brief skeptical discussion of
the possibility of constitutionalizing a commitment to competition.
I. THREE PUBLIC COMMITMENTS
Three broad public commitments—entrenched norms accepted
and enforced by public institutions—underlie the modern U.S.
economy: (1) the protection of private economic rights to property
and contract,11 (2) the protection or fostering of competition among
firms,12 and (3) a social safety net to protect those vulnerable to
6. Cf. William J. Novak, Law and the Social Control of American Capitalism, 60 EMORY
L.J. 377, 398 (2010) (stating that police power regulation saw “insistent expansion” from 1877
to 1932).
7. See infra notes 92-94, 107-10 and accompanying text.
8. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.”).
9. See infra notes 39-42, 80-82 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part I.A.
12. See infra Part I.B.
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hardship from market forces.13 The first of these commitments has
explicit constitutional protection.14 The others can be understood
today as supra-constitutional norms.15 The three commitments will
be sketched, but on the whole this Article will take them as given.
The Article is concerned primarily with the way the competition
commitment has been implemented and protected, not with the
contours of the three commitments or how they were established.
A. Private Economic Rights
The Constitution recognizes protection of both contract and pro-
perty rights as public commitments. The states may not impair the
obligation of contracts.16 The Fifth Amendment forbids the federal
government from taking private property for public use without just
compensation.17 The Takings Clause was extended to the states by
incorporation through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.18 During the late nineteenth century, the Supreme
Court famously interpreted the latter provision to protect the “lib-
erty of contract.”19
13. See infra Part I.C.
14. See infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
15. See ESKRIDGE JR.& FEREJOHN, supra note 5, at 16-17 (regarding both antitrust and
social insurance as fundamental norms found in “federal superstatutes”). If the commitment
to a social safety net has a constitutional hook, it would be the Income Tax Amendment,
ratified in 1913, which made it practical for the federal government to engage in redis-
tribution. U.S. CONST. amend XVI. But Social Security, the most important marker of the
public commitment to a social safety net, was not placed on firm constitutional footing until
a quarter-century later. See infra note 94.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Supreme Court has declined to apply Contract
Clause principles to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R. A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 731-34 (1984) (holding
retroactive federal economic legislation constitutional and refusing to apply heightened
judicial scrutiny regardless of the Contract clause standard); cf. United States v. Winstar
Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 875-76 (1996) (suggesting the possibility of some due process protection
for vested rights created by federal legislation, but describing due process standards as “less
exacting” than contract clause standards and the scope of their protection as “obscure”).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see, e.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. Chicago,
166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897) (holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
required Illinois to award just compensation when taking private property for public use); Mo.
Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403, 417 (1896) (holding that a state order requiring a
railroad to surrender part of its land was a taking that violated the Fourteenth Amendment).
19. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-54, 61 (1905) (holding that a New York
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B. Competitive Markets
The Supreme Court has frequently described the antitrust laws
in near-constitutional terms. It has called the Sherman Antitrust
Act,20 the first and most important federal antitrust statute, “the
Magna Carta of free enterprise,”21 and “a comprehensive charter of
economic liberty aimed at preserving free and unfettered competi-
tion as the rule of trade.”22 “The heart of our national economic
policy,” the Court has stated, “long has been faith in the value of
competition.”23
During the nineteenth century, as detailed below, the Supreme
Court construed economic rights to permit public protection of com-
petition.24 But competition was not fully established as an en-
trenched norm until the twentieth century.25 Eskridge and Ferejohn
view it as established not in 1890, when Congress passed the
Sherman Act, but in 1914, with congressional passage of the
Clayton Act on the heels of a presidential election fought over the
economic role of large firms.26 But the contours of the competition
norm were strongly contested in domestic politics through the
statute limiting the hours bakers could work interfered with the right of contract and thus
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165
U.S. 578, 589 (1897) (holding that a Louisiana statute prohibiting foreign insurance com-
panies from conducting intrastate business without maintaining at least one place of business
and an authorized agent in the state violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
20. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2012).
21. United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
22. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see also Verizon Commc’ns Inc.
v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 415 (2004); United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-
60 (1933).
23. Nat’l Soc'y of Prof. Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 695 (1978) (quoting Standard
Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 248 (1951)).
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Part III.
26. ESKRIDGE JR.& FEREJOHN, supra note 5, at 123-34. For Eskridge and Ferejohn, a
superstatutory principle or policy becomes entrenched when a statute is prompted by an
important public need, implemented successfully to further its goals, able to attract en-
thusiastic and growing public support, and ratified by a subsequent legislature. Id. at 17; see
also TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 77 (2018) (de-
scribing the 1914 enactment of federal antitrust legislation as “arguably of Constitutional
significance”).
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1930s,27 and the antitrust laws were effectively suspended for a
time during the early New Deal.28 For that reason, I view the public
commitment to a competition norm as established later, during the
1940s.29
C. Social Safety Net
The federal programs we think of today as creating a social safety
net were mainly established in their modern form during the New
Deal, though they had Populist and Progressive predecessors, in-
cluding in the states, and they have been augmented since the
1930s. These programs include government-run insurance (such as
Social Security, Medicare, the Affordable Care Act, and unemploy-
ment insurance), direct governmental provision of services (includ-
ing the welfare system and Head Start), and tax policy (including
deductions for expenditures on child care, education, and job train-
ing).30 The safety net also includes various regulatory programs
27. See Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J.
483, 499 (2006).
28. See National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 67, §§ 2-3, 48 Stat. 195, 195-97
(1933) (creating the National Recovery Administration allowing them to create judicially
enforceable “codes of fair competition”); Jason E. Taylor, Cartel Code Attributes and Cartel
Performance: An Industry-Level Analysis of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 50 J.L. &
ECON. 597, 598, 600 (2007) (describing the National Industrial Recovery Act as “a 23-month
experiment in government-sponsored cartels” that allowed “businesses ... to engage in col-
lusive behavior”). A contemporaneous Supreme Court decision adopted a lax attitude toward
price fixing among rivals. Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 373-75
(1933).
29. See Baker, supra note 27, at 501-02 (noting that the regulation of “large firm conduct
... became the basis of national regulatory policy” during this time); see also Jonathan B.
Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and Future of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2175, 2182-83 (2013) [hereinafter Baker, Economics and Politics]; Jonathan B. Baker,
Preserving a Political Bargain: The Political Economy of the Non-Interventionist Challenge to
Monopolization Enforcement, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 605, 607-08, 630-31 (2010) [hereinafter
Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain]. Eskridge and Ferejohn might say that I have described
what they term a cycle of entrenchment and disentrenchment, followed by entrenchment. See
ESKRIDGE JR. & FEREJOHN, supra note 5, at 303-04. 
30. See What Are the Major Federal Safety Net Programs in the U.S.?, U.C. DAVIS CTR. FOR
POVERTY RES., https://poverty.ucdavis.edu/article/war-poverty-and-todays-safety-net-0 [https://
perma.cc/J2TD-AL4M]. Owners of firms are insulated from the vagaries of the market to some
extent too, through the limited liability accorded to corporate shareholders. See Stephen M.
Bainbridge, Abolishing Veil Piercing, 26 J. CORP. L. 479, 483 (2001) (arguing for the abol-
ishment of a prominent exception to general limitation on shareholder liability for corporate
debts or tortious actions). But the U.S. has not created a general safety net for producers. 
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offering protection against economic hardship to vulnerable groups,
such as agricultural price supports,31 minimum wage legislation,32
and requirements that certain businesses provide service to all
comers on nondiscriminatory terms.33
Two decades after the enactment of Social Security, President
Eisenhower—the leader of the political party that was home to
many opponents of social insurance—recognized that social safety
net programs had come to reflect an entrenched public norm.34 In
private correspondence with his brother, Eisenhower observed,
“Should any political party attempt to abolish social security, un-
employment insurance, and eliminate labor laws and farm pro-
grams, you would not hear of that party again in our political
history.”35 The appropriate and constitutionally permissible extent
of the safety net continues to be debated, as reflected in legal and
political battles over the Affordable Care Act.36 But as Eisenhower
recognized sixty-five years ago, a substantial social safety net is now
an accepted superstatutory norm.
D. Commitments in Tension
The three public commitments shaping the governmental role in
economic life have an obvious potential for tension. A thoroughgo-
ing effort to protect economic rights could insulate the exercise of
market power from government intervention. For example, one
might say it encroaches on property and contract if a firm is
prevented from charging a monopoly price to a willing buyer,37 or
31. See generally GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 96-900 ENR, FARM
COMMODITY LEGISLATION: CHRONOLOGY, 1933-2002 (2002).
32. E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 206 Supp. II 2015 (establishing a federal minimum wage).
33. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. & ERNEST GELLHORN, REGULATED INDUSTRIES 165-67, 217-18
(4th ed. 1999) (discussing prohibitions on undue discrimination in rate-setting by regulated
utilities and obligations of regulated utilities to provide service); 47 U.S.C. § 202 (2012)
(setting forth common carrier obligations of communications providers).
34. Letter from Dwight David Eisenhower to Edgar Newton Eisenhower (Nov. 8, 1954),
in 15 THE PAPERS OF DWIGHT DAVID EISENHOWER 1386, 1386 (Louis Galambos et al. eds.,
1996).
35. Id.
36. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (deciding the
constitutionality of the individual mandate and Medicaid expansion provisions of the Af-
fordable Care Act).
37. See Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142-43 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting) (stating that
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prevented from making exclusive agreements with suppliers or dis-
tributors that benefit both contracting parties but have the effect of
limiting competition by excluding rivals from access to customers or
the market. Thoroughgoing protection of economic rights could also
inhibit the development of social insurance by precluding the pro-
gressive taxation required for redistribution, or by blocking other
safety net programs on the argument that the public may not reg-
ulate in ways that restrict the way firms exercise their property
rights.38 One could also imagine the reverse, where an exclusive
focus on protecting competition or implementing a strong social
safety net would be said to undermine economic rights.
The other pair of commitments, to competition and a social safety
net, could also be in tension. Competition leads to losers as well as
winners, while social insurance ameliorates losses. Hence a thor-
oughgoing commitment to protecting vulnerable farmers, workers,
and families from the vagaries of the marketplace could lead to the
adoption of policies that limit competition. Conversely, strong pro-
tections for competition, letting the chips fall as they may, would
limit the tools available for strengthening the social safety net.
II. HARMONIZING COMPETITION WITH PRIVATE RIGHTS
During the nineteenth century, the commitment to protection of
private economic rights had to be harmonized with the emerging,
but not fully established, commitment to competition (as well as
with an early aspect of the safety net, the need for health and safety
regulation). Doing so was importantly a problem for the courts
because contract and property were accorded constitutional pro-
tection.39 The doctrinal solution was found in the police power,
which functioned as an exemption to that protection for government
efforts to assure competitive markets.40 The key judicial landmarks,
legislative determination of the price that an owner will receive for the use of his property is
the practical equivalent of a deprivation of private property).
38. Cf. Leo P. Martinez, “To Lay and Collect Taxes”: The Constitutional Case for
Progressive Taxation, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 111, 113-14 (1999) (disputing the claim that
progressive federal taxation violates the Takings Clause).
39. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; id. amend. V.
40. By contrast, before the New Deal, the police power was generally thought not to
permit redistribution, a key building block for the modern social safety net. See James May,
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discussed below, were two Supreme Court decisions: Munn v.
Illinois, an 1877 decision holding that the Constitution permitted
state regulation of monopolies,41 and Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v.
United States, an 1899 decision that confirmed the constitutionality
of the federal antitrust laws.42
A. Munn
Forty years before Munn, the Supreme Court famously confronted
the tension between private economic rights and competition in
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge.43 The case was brought by
the owners of a toll bridge chartered by the Massachusetts legisla-
ture in 1785.44 They argued that in 1828, the legislature had
impaired the constitutional obligation not to undermine contract
rights by permitting another firm to construct a second bridge next
to the first.45 The constitutional issue depended on the scope of the
property right conferred by the first bridge’s charter—that is, on
whether the charter gave the first bridge the exclusive right to span
the river, and if so for what distance?46
The Court held that the state legislature had not granted the first
bridge a right that excluded the second bridge, and so it had not
Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in Constitutional and Antitrust
Analysis, 1800-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 263-65 (1989).
41. 94 U.S. 113.
42. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
43. 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837). Ten years earlier, the Court had upheld the
constitutionality of a prospective debtor relief law enacted by New York under the Contract
Clause. Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 313 (1827). Ogden created space for
states to address pressing public needs by establishing that states could legislate prospec-
tively in ways that affected contracts. Id. at 260-61, 267. States eventually began to condition
new corporate charters on the acceptance of future regulation, thereby effectively removing
the terms of such charters from Contract Clause protection over the course of the ensuing
century. See Jonathan B. Baker, Has the Contract Clause Counter-Revolution Halted?
Rhetoric, Rights, and Markets in Constitutional Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71, 80
(1984).
44. Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 536.
45. Id. at 537. The Contract Clause was implicated because corporate charters are
understood to be contracts between the firm’s owners and the state. Baker, supra note 43, at
80. At the time, corporations were chartered individually by state legislatures for specified
and limited purposes. See Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. at 543-44 (comparing the right to
operate a ferry granted under one charter with the rights given to build a bridge in its place,
granted under a different charter).
46. Charles River Bridge, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) at 539-40.
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acted inconsistently with its constitutional obligation.47 The legal
issue was entwined with the policy question of whether competition
or monopoly was more important for promoting economic progress.
Chief Justice Taney, writing for the court, worried that a decision
for the first bridge would allow turnpikes and canals to block the
development of railroads along the same line of travel.48 Justice
Story, who dissented, thought that failing to protect property rights
would discourage investment because firms would fear that if rival
investments succeeded, new competitiors would appropriate the
return properly accruing to the initial investor.49
The Charles River Bridge decision ameliorated the tension
between economic rights and competition by making clear that the
Supreme Court would not assume a legislative intent to displace
competition; an express and unambiguous statutory mandate would
be required.50 Munn went further by establishing that the states
had the inherent police power to respond to the exercise of market
power by regulating prices.51 Viewed more broadly, it established
that constitutional protections for private property did not prevent
regulation in the service of the public good when markets did not
perform competitively.
The Illinois law at issue in Munn set a maximum price that
warehouses (grain elevators) could charge for grain storage in Chi-
cago.52 Chicago was the central transportation hub for grain shipped
from farms across the Midwest to large port cities along the At-
lantic, where it would be sent to Europe.53 The grain trade was
described as “form[ing] the largest part of inter-state commerce,”
linking “seven or eight of the great States of the West with four or
47. Id. at 548-49.
48. Id. at 552-53.
49. Id. at 608 (Story, J., dissenting).
50. See id. at 549 (majority opinion).
51. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125, 133-34 (1877). The reserved police powers doctrine
arguably derives from Charles River Bridge. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND MARKETS IN
UNITED STATES HISTORY 84-85 (1982). Nineteenth century Contract Clause decisions often
relied on the police power. See, e.g., Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 821 (1879); Fertilizing
Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U.S. 659, 670 (1878); W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507,
531-32 (1848).
52. Munn, 94 U.S. at 123.
53. Id. at 130.
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five of the States lying on the sea-shore.”54 Chicago had fourteen
“immense” grain warehouses, all centrally located between the rail
terminal and river harbor.55 The fourteen warehouses were con-
trolled by nine firms that fixed prices annually, potentially making
them “a ‘virtual’ monopoly.”56
The plaintiff warehouses had argued that the state’s price reg-
ulation was inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment’s pro-
hibition against depriving any person of property “without due
process of law.”57 The Court held that this constitutional provision
did not limit the state, in the exercise of its police power to protect
the public from injurious activities, from regulating private property
“affected with a public interest,” including by regulating the
maximum price.58 The grain warehouses were affected with a public
interest because they stood “in the very ‘gateway of commerce,’ and
take toll from all who pass.”59 This reasoning authorized state
regulation of prices in response to the exercise of market power
throughout the economy, at least in industries playing an important
role in interstate commerce. It harmonized the protection of com-
petition with private economic rights by allowing a state to regulate
when private markets demonstrably failed to confer the benefits of
competition.60
The dissent in Munn argued that the majority’s test for whether
private property was affected with a public interest had no bounds,
and would permit a state to regulate all business without lim-
itation.61 The dissent foreshadowed the Lochner era of constitutional
interpretation by seeking to demarcate a sphere of purely private
activity free from governmental interference.62
54. Id. at 130-31.
55. Id. at 131.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 123.
58. Id. at 125-126, 133-34.
59. Id. at 132.
60. Commentators debate the practical scope of the state regulatory power authorized by
Munn. See Novak, supra note 6, at 400-04 (arguing that Munn permitted wide-ranging state
regulation of economic activity, in contrast with the view of “most historians” that it
circumscribed state regulation by limiting it to businesses affected with a public interest).
61. Munn, 94 U.S. at 140, 148 (Field, J., dissenting).
62. Cf. May, supra note 40, at 267 (discussing criticism of “formalistic techniques of
boundary definition” employed by the Lochner-era Court).
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B. Addyston Pipe
During the Lochner era, which began in the late 1890s and ended
in the 1930s,63 the Supreme Court identified and protected a sub-
stantive due process right to the “liberty of contract” against state
interference through economic regulation.64 The Court feared the
misuse of state power to advance private economic interests.65 But
it did not fear state efforts to protect competition. Rather, it saw the
Constitution as a bulwark against the use of state regulatory power
to engage in redistribution to further the parochial interests of
favored social groups.66
In Coppage v. Kansas, decided in 1915, the Court invalidated a
state law that prevented firms from insisting that their employees
not join a union on the view that Kansas had simply been acting to
prefer one interest group, labor unions, over another, employers.67
The Court would not accept interference with private economic
rights—here the right of an employer and employee to set the terms
of employment by contract—absent a reasonable public welfare
justification.68 The Court expressly rejected the view that the state
could regulate in order to level “inequalities of fortune,” on the
ground that doing so would serve one group of private interests
without promoting the general welfare.69 Although the Court had
previously taken the view that a state could institute a worker
63. The Lochner era is commonly dated from Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897),
though it takes its name from Lochner v. New York (1905). See Alan J. Meese, Standard Oil
as Lochner’s Trojan Horse, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 783, 792 (2012) (stating that the same due
process protection granted to the liberty of contract recognized in Lochner was first recognized
eight years earlier in Allgeyer).
64. E.g., Lochner, 198 U.S. at 53, 61 (invalidating a New York law preventing bakeries
from allowing bakers to work more than ten hours per day).
65. See, e.g., id. at 62-64.
66. Routine governmental activities—taxation, regulation, protection of public safety,
procurement, and the like—necessarily have distributional consequences but were not
prohibited on that account. The Lochner-era Court upheld progressive state and federal
inheritance taxation as constitutional, however. Magoun v. Ill. Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S.
283, 300-01 (1898); Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 109 (1900). Alan Meese suggests that the
Lochner-era Court would even have accepted state use of the tax system to make direct
transfers to the poor. Alan J. Meese, Will, Judgment, and Economic Liberty: Mr. Justice
Souter and the Mistranslation of the Due Process Clause, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 3, 51 (1999).
67. 236 U.S. 1, 6, 16 (1915).
68. Id. at 14.
69. Id. at 17-19.
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compensation program for on-the-job injuries and deaths to advance
a public interest in preventing “pauperism,” which led to “vice and
crime,”70 the Court’s hostility to redistribution that would benefit
society’s losers, evident in Coppage, would have made it difficult to
expand that rationale to support the development of an increasingly
robust social safety net.71
At the same time, the Lochner-era Supreme Court was sympa-
thetic to antitrust. It had no problem accommodating an initially
circumscribed, but increasingly wide-ranging, federal competition
policy (enforcement of the Sherman Act) with protecting contract
and property rights, even as it balked at permitting redistribution,
because it objected to all artificial interference with the market,
public or private.72 Not surprisingly, an Oklahoma law limiting
entry into the manufacturing and distribution of ice—a governmen-
tal act that had the effect of protecting a monopoly from competi-
tion—was held repugnant to the Due Process Clause of the Consti-
tution.73 Perhaps less predictably, the Court took the view, in
Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, that the Sherman
Act—which interdicted private interference with the market—
actually enhanced the liberty of contract.74
70. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 207 (1917).
71. See generally R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (holding that a federal
retirement plan for railroads violated the Due Process and Commerce Clauses). Although this
decision was handed down when the Court was transitioning away from its Lochner era
jurisprudence, the majority opinion was joined by the Justices most sympathetic to the
Lochner period’s perspective.
72. See May, supra note 40, at 275-78, 301-03, 305, 308-09; Alan J. Meese, Liberty and
Antitrust in the Formative Era, 79 B.U. L. REV. 1, 9-13 (1999) (highlighting the difficulty of
reconciling Lochner -era judicial hostility to redistributive legislation with the views of some
commentators that antitrust law during its formative era was concerned with preventing
wealth transfers); Meese, supra note 63, at 787-801 (describing how the Supreme Court’s
antitrust decision in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), applied Lochner to
antitrust policy).
73. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 278-79 (1932).
74. See 175 U.S. 211, 229-30 (1899); see also Smiley v. Kansas, 196 U.S. 447, 456-57 (1905)
(upholding state prohibition against an agreement among rivals to limit purchases of wheat
on the ground that the state statute barring private contracts that prevent competition was
within the state’s police power); cf. William H. Page, Ideological Conflict and the Origins of
Antitrust Policy, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1, 47 (1991) (“The coercive elements of the restraints [in
Addyston Pipe] themselves inhibited liberty of contract and the application of the statute
preserved it.”). But cf. Meese, supra note 72, at 61-67 (concluding that the Court, in Addyston
Pipe, harmonized its liberty of contract jurisprudence with its construction of the Sherman
Act by viewing the prohibited cartel as a direct restraint on commerce that could be prohibited
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Addyston Pipe involved a government suit under the Sherman
Act to forbid an express agreement among six manufacturers of
iron pipe to eliminate competition by dividing markets.75 Writing
for the Court, Justice Rufus Peckham, who famously supported
expansive substantive due process protection for contract and
property rights,76 declared that the liberty of contract did not
“include a right to make a contract which in fact restrained and
regulated interstate commerce” after Congress had acted to prohibit
the contract.77 The Sherman Act was not at odds with the Constitu-
tion because the private contracts it forbade “may in truth be as far
reaching in their effect upon interstate commerce as would the
legislation of a single [s]tate of the same character.”78 
Addyston Pipe insulated the antitrust laws against constitutional
claims of interference with property and contract rights. When the
Lochner-era Court found that the Constitution limited the reach of
the Sherman Act, its concern was with circumscribing the scope of
federal power relative to state power under the Commerce Clause,
not with protecting private economic rights under the Due Process
Clause.79
III. HARMONIZING COMPETITION WITH THE SOCIAL SAFETY NET
During the twentieth century, the political system had to harmo-
nize all three economic commitments: to protect private economic
rights and to secure competitive markets while instituting a social
without abridging personal liberties); Nicola Giocoli, Neither Populist nor Neoclassical: The
Classical Roots of the Competition Principle in American Antitrust (June 20, 2018)
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3199703 [https://perma.cc/P9KN-NR8Q]
(same).
75. See 175 U.S. at 235-37.
76. See May, supra note 40, at 303-04.
77. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 229. Alan Meese observes that Justice Peckham’s views
about the constitutionality of cartel regulation differed from those he had expressed a decade
earlier, when serving on the New York Court of Appeals, and attributes that change to his
recognition that entry would not necessarily counteract supracompetitive cartel pricing.
Meese, supra note 72, at 10-12, 30-32, 35-36, 63 n.319, 65-67; cf. Baker, supra note 43, at 83-
84 (tying constitutional decisions about the appropriate scope of economic regulation to
judicial views about the appropriate scope of public and private spheres and about the extent
to which markets perform well absent government intervention).
78. Addyston Pipe, 175 U.S. at 229-30.
79. See United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1895).
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safety net.80 Doing so required first that the Supreme Court over-
turn nineteenth century constitutional prohibitions against re-
distribution. This was accomplished through the constitutional
revolution of the 1930s.81 In addition, the political system had to
assure that neither private economic rights nor redistributive
impulses undercut the laws protecting competitive markets. That
accommodation took place during the 1940s, through an informal
political bargain reflected judicially in important antitrust deci-
sions.82
A. The New Deal-Era Constitutional Revolution
The well-known shift in constitutional interpretation during the
New Deal will be described briefly. It took place in two stages, the
first in 193483 and the second in 1937.84
In 1934, the Supreme Court rejected the classification methodol-
ogy relied upon by the Lochner-era Court.85 That Court had sought
to determine whether the economic legislation under review oper-
ated within the public sphere of the police power, hence constitu-
tional, or within the private sphere of contract and property, hence
repugnant to the Constitution.86 Instead of demarcating spheres, the
New Deal-era Court sought to harmonize individual rights and
public interests.87 It did so by asking whether the legislation pur
80. See supra Part I (describing the three public commitments).
81. See infra Part III.A.
82. See infra Part III.B.
83. See infra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 92-94 and accompanying text. These decisions were issued before
President Franklin Roosevelt had the opportunity to appoint any Justices. Cf. Barry
Cushman, The Place of Economic Crisis in American Constitutional Law: The Great
Depression As a Case Study, in LIBERAL CONSTITUTIONS IN FINANCIAL CRISES (Tom Ginsburg,
Mark Rosen, & Georg Vanberg eds., forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3253353
[https://perma.cc/R8A3-FAQQ] (attributing the Supreme Court’s change of course to a judicial
recognition that legislation responding to the Great Depression could be sustained under prior
constitutional doctrines that recognized the relevance of conditions of economic crisis).
85. See Baker, supra note 43, at 85-86.
86. See, e.g., Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 473 (1934) (Sutherland,
J., dissenting) (dissent by four Justices associated with the Lochner majority arguing that if
the law infringes on private sphere, it violates the Constitution, emergency or not, and if it
is in the public sphere it should be upheld); cf. Baker, supra note 43, at 93-95 (describing a
shift from analytic to conclusory tests in contract clause jurisprudence).
87. See Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 435 (majority opinion) (noting “progressive recognition” by
2019] HARMONIZING NATIONAL ECONOMIC COMMITMENTS 1165
sued a legitimate end through reasonable and appropriate means.88
Previously, the Court’s constitutional review of economic legislation
had been concerned primarily with preventing special interest rent-
seeking.89 Now, during an economic emergency (the Great Depres-
sion), the Court also sought to avoid paralyzing the state from
acting to address pressing social needs.90 
Notwithstanding these doctrinal changes, some wide-ranging
New Deal regulatory initiatives were found constitutionally invalid
in 1935 and 1936.91 In 1937, the Court went further. It relaxed the
scrutiny of the connection between means and ends by deferring to
legislative judgments,92 and it treated redistribution as a legitimate
public end.93 For decades after 1937, in consequence, the Court gave
the courts that Contract Clause protections must be “harmoniz[ed]” with state police power);
id. at 439 (stating that the constitutional limitation must be construed “in harmony” with the
reserved police power); id. at 442 (observing that fundamental state interests are directly
affected by private contracts in modern society, requiring a “rational compromise” between
individual rights and public welfare); see also W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426, 433
(1934) (describing Blaisdell as extending the scope of state police power to include laws
regulating injurious business practices); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); cf.
Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 448 (applying the same analysis to the Due Process Clause).
88. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 437-38; Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 525, 537 (stating that means must
“have a have real and substantial relation” to ends, which must be a proper legislative
purpose).
89. E.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 6, 16, 17-19 (1915).
90. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 439-40, 443-44. The connection between the way courts ar-
ticulate (rhetorically) the distinction between appropriate and inappropriate exercises of
public power and their views about effectiveness of private markets in allocating resources
is discussed in Baker, supra note 43, at 92-93,103. 
91. E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 308-10 (1936) (invalidating legislation
that authorized labor regulation as outside the federal commerce power); United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 68 (1936) (invalidating legislation that used the federal tax and spending
power to pay farmers to curtail production); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295
U.S. 495, 550 (1935) (holding that the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitutionally
delegated legislative power, and that its application to intrastate activities exceeded the
federal commerce power); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 360 (1935) (holding
federal railroad retirement legislation unconstitutional under the due process and commerce
clauses).
92. See W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399-400 (1937) (upholding a Washington
State law setting a minimum wage for women and minors and indicating that the legislature
is entitled to make the policy judgment that the law would help women and the community
by reducing demands for relief during the Depression); see also United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 154 (1938) (engaging in highly limited rational basis review of
economic legislation).
93. In 1937, the Supreme Court upheld the taxation and benefits aspects of Social Se-
curity as constitutional. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 582-83, 585-89 (1937)
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only cursory constitutional scrutiny to state and federal economic
regulatory legislation.94
B. Competition Policy as a Political Bargain
In an important respect, the constitutional revolution of the 1930s
undermined the ability of public authorities to assure competitive
markets. It did so by offering constitutional protection to a wider
range of regulatory approaches. In its wake, Oklahoma was con-
stitutionally permitted to adopt regulations that protected optome-
trists and opthamologists against competition from opticians, for
example.95 California could create a marketing program for raisins
that had the effect of cartelizing an agricultural product grown only
in that state, thereby raising the price of raisins to consumers
throughout the nation.96 To similar effect, Congress has enacted ex-
emptions to the antitrust laws for certain industries.97 The antitrust
laws remain on firm constitutional footing, but Congress and the
states have greater scope to regulate in ways that displace competi-
tion today than they did a century ago.
The public commitment to competitive markets was not consti-
tutionalized, so has been left to governmental actors to embrace and
enforce.98 That happened during the 1940s, through the involvement
(taxation); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (benefits).
94. E.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488-91 (1955). Commerce
Clause limitations on federal regulatory power were also relaxed, beginning in 1937. See
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. 301 U.S. 1, 37-38, 49 (1937); see also Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22, 32-33 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 128-29 (1942); United
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114, 118-19 (1941).
95. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. at 486-87.
96. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51, 367-68 (1943) (holding that in the absence of
an express Congressional prohibition, states may regulate products shipped in interstate
commerce, and that the Sherman Act does not prevent states from authorizing conduct that
would violate the antitrust laws if undertaken by private parties). Later decisions limit “state
action” immunity to state regulatory schemes that clearly articulate an intention to displace
competition and are actively supervised by the state. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980).
97. See ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE 1345-47 (3d ed. 2017);
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, HANDBOOK ON THE SCOPE OF ANTITRUST 275 (2015). In
addition, the Supreme Court has implied antitrust immunity for the activities of regulated
firms when antitrust enforcement would be incompatible with a federal regulatory scheme.
Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 279, 285 (2007). 
98. See supra Part I.B.
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of all three branches of the federal government. The executive
branch, through the leadership of Thurman Arnold at the helm of
the Justice Department’s Antitrust Division, expanded antitrust
enforcement.99 In his five years on the job, Arnold “brought almost
as many antitrust suits as the Division had in the previous fifty.”100
His blockbuster price-fixing case against the oil industry,101 and a
major monopolization case against the dominant aluminum pro-
ducer that Arnold enthusiastically pursued through trial and
appeal,102 resulted in landmark judicial opinions on price-fixing
(Socony-Vacuum103) and monopolization (Alcoa104) respectively.
Socony-Vacuum took away virtually all defenses to price-fixing,105
99. See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Antitrust Legacy of Thurman Arnold, 78 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 569 (2004). Arnold built on the work of his predecessor, future Justice Robert
H. Jackson. See Robert H. Jackson, The Struggle Against Monopoly, Address at the Georgia
Bar Association Annual Meeting (May 28, 1937), in GA. B.A. REP., Dec. 1937, at 203, 203, 205-
06. See generally Robert H. Jackson, Should the Antitrust Laws be Revised? 71 U.S. L. REV.
575 (1937).
100. William E. Kovacic, The Federal Trade Commission and Congressional Oversight of
Antitrust Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 610 (1982). See generally Waller, supra note 99.
Distinctively, Arnold often brought multiple enforcement actions targeted at industry-specific
bottlenecks to competition, and the cases were often resolved by consent-decree. ESKRIDGE 
JR. & FEREJOHN, supra note 5, at 137-38. The outcome of litigation is a better indicator of the
level enforcement strictness than the number of cases brought, cases investigated, or
settlements accepted, however. Increased agency litigation can be interpreted as signaling
that enforcement is growing more stringent (that is, as an indicator of the direction of
change). In the long run, though, the number of cases brought should recede as well-counseled
firms adjust to the movement of the line between lawful and unlawful conduct toward greater
restriction of firm conduct. See Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal
Merger Enforcement, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE EFFECT OF
CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 235, 245 (Robert Pitofsky ed., 2008)
(discussing the appropriate interpretation of merger enforcement statistics).
101. Daniel A. Crane, The Story of United States v. Socony-Vacuum: Hot Oil and Antitrust
in the Two New Deals, in ANTITRUST STORIES 91, 92, 108-09 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A.
Crane eds., 2007).
102. Waller, supra note 99, at 590-91. The case was filed 11 months before Arnold took
office. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416, 421 (2d Cir. 1945)
(“The plaintiff filed its complaint on April 23, 1937.”); Waller, supra note 99, at 577 (“Arnold
was sworn in on March 21, 1938.”).
103. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218-20, 224 (1940). 
104. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 432. The appeal was heard by a special panel set up by Congress
when the Supreme Court lacked a quorum and the decision is treated as though it were a
Supreme Court precedent. See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811-12 (1946). 
105. Socony-Vacuum, 310 U.S. at 224 n.59. The Court also specifically rejected the
prevention of ruinous competition as a justification for price-fixing because that defense would
be antithetical to spirit of Sherman Act, which it termed a charter of freedom. Id. at 221.
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and Alcoa came close to making monopoly illegal per se.106 In 1950,
Congress ratified the public commitment to assuring competitive
markets by strengthening the statute prohibiting anticompetitive
mergers,107 and the Supreme Court responded by reframing and
bolstering merger law in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States.108 In that
opinion, the Court emphasized that Congress sought to arrest
trends toward lessening competition in a market in their incip-
iency,109 and was concerned with probabilities not certainties.110
I have called the informal social understanding adopting compe-
tition as national economic policy a “political bargain.”111 In brief
summary, the bargain bridged an important political cleavage over
the role of the government in regulating large firms between two
large and diffuse interest groups: “consumers” (a group that his-
torically also included farmers and small business) and producers
(large firms).112 The two groups compromised their parochial in-
terests—consumers in regulating large firms and redistributing
their rents, and producers in remaining free from governmental
supervision and thereby potentially obtaining rents from the
exercise of market power—and reached an accommodation that
allowed them to split the social gains arising in competitive
markets.113 The economy could capture efficiencies that would be
unavailable through the systematic adoption of microeconomic
106. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 427-28.
107. Celler-Kefauver Antimerger Act of 1950, Pub. L. 81-89, 64 Stat. 1125-26; see Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 311-23 (1962) (reviewing the 1950 Celler-Kefauver
Act amendments to Clayton Act § 7 and their legislative history). The enactment of the Cellar-
Kefauver Act may not count as a moment of public deliberation and legislative ratification of
the sort that Eskridge and Ferejohn look to when identifying a superstatute, but the collective
efforts of the three branches of government resolved a bitter political debate that had gone
on for half a century after the Sherman Act was passed. Baker, supra note 27, at 502. 
108. 370 U.S. at 315-23.
109. Id. at 317.
110. Id. at 323.
111. This paragraph summarizes the argument in Jonathan B. Baker, Competition Policy
as a Political Bargain, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 485-93 (2006); see also Baker, Economics and
Politics, supra note 29, at 2182-84; Baker, Preserving a Political Bargain, supra note 29, at
628-33.
112. See Baker, supra note 27, at 483, 486. This perspective is consistent with Populist and
Progressive accounts of domestic politics as a struggle between “the people” and “the in-
terests.” See id. at 495.
113. See id. at 483-84, 490-91.
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policy approaches that would instead rely primarily on direct
regulation or laissez-faire.114
Perhaps the welfare gains from competition would have been
sufficient to induce political acceptance of the informal competition
bargain on its own terms. More likely, it required sweeteners, which
economists call “side payments,” for the consumer group.115 The
most important side payment was the contemporaneous develop-
ment and later expansion of a more substantial social safety net.116
The safety net headed off some of the political pressure to regulate
large firm conduct directly by limiting the downside risk to consum-
ers, workers, and their families from participating in a competitive
market economy.117 On this account, competition policy could not
have become an entrenched public commitment before the constitu-
tional revolution of the 1930s made it possible to complement it with
social insurance, allowing the full development of a modern social
safety net.118
The antitrust rules that the courts developed and enforced during
the 1940s through 1970s were consistent with the political bar-
gain.119 So, too, were the less interventionist rules developed by the
Supreme Court beginning during the late 1970s.120 The Chicago-
oriented reworking of antitrust rules did not undermine the funda-
mental character of the informal understanding, as rejecting laissez-
faire and direct regulatory approaches in favor of competition
policy.121 But it pushed the rules so that, taken as a whole, they now
114. See id. at 483-84, 490-91, 493; Baker, Economics and Politics, supra note 29, at 2183.
115. Baker, Economics and Politics, supra note 29 at 2186-87.
116. See id.
117. See id.
118. See id.; supra Part II.
119. See Baker, supra note 27, at 484, 505-15.
120. See id. The transition from antitrust’s structural era to the Chicago School era that
began during the late 1970s is described in Jonathan B. Baker, A Preface to Post-Chicago
Antitrust, in POST-CHICAGO DEVELOPMENTS IN ANTITRUST LAW 60, 65-67 (Antonio Cucinotta
et al. eds., 2002). But cf. Jack M. Balkin, The Recent Unpleasantness: Understanding the
Cycles of Constitutional Time, 94 IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=
3222311 [https://perma.cc/T557-VCPE] (describing the post-1980 period as a distinct regime
in American constitutional history, replacing the New Deal/Civil Rights regime that had
dominated politics between 1932 and 1980).
121. See Baker, supra note 27, at 484, 505-15.
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approach the noninterventionist (laissez-faire) edge of the permissi-
ble spectrum.122
From today’s vantage point, the current antitrust rules, as a
group, have proved inadequate.123 Over recent decades, recent evi-
dence makes clear, the exercise of market power in the U.S. eco-
nomy has widened and become substantial.124 The political bargain
is now endangered: unless antitrust rules are strengthened, the bar-
gain will be rejected by stealth. The threat to the informal political
compromise is heightened by the fraying of the social safety net in
response to political pressure from advocates of a smaller govern-
ment, as that restricts a side payment that facilitated consumer
acceptance of the political bargain. In the short run, rejection of the
bargain would empower firms able to exercise market power to do
so free of governmental restraints. Over time, a political mobiliza-
tion by the victims of market power could lead to a reaction that
favors extensive regulation over policies to restore competition.
In short, the public commitment to competition is threatened and,
if current trends continue, it would be abandoned. This outcome has
become possible, in part, because competition policy is no longer un-
derstood as furthering constitutional values. During the late nine-
teenth century, legislative protection of competition was seen as
complementary to the constitutional protection of economic rights
in preventing artificial interference with the market.125 The present
constitutional scheme instead treats competition as a policy choice
that could be discarded, notwithstanding its extensive pedigree, if
the political system chose to focus exclusively on protecting proper-
ty and contract by giving large firms free reign or if the political
system chose to adopt an extensive program of economic regulation
in place of competition.
122. Baker, Economics and Politics, supra note 29, at 2184-86; Baker, Preserving a Political
Bargain, supra note 29, at 632.
123. The argument in this paragraph is developed more fully in chapters 1 and 2 of
JONATHAN B. BAKER, THE ANTITRUST PARADIGM: RESTORING A COMPETITIVE ECONOMY
(forthcoming 2019); see also Jonathan B. Baker, Market Power in the U.S. Economy Today,
WASH. CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH (Mar. 20, 2017), http://equitablegrowth.org/market-
power-in-the-u-s-economy-today [https://perma.cc/K39G-HDJ5] (setting forth evidence of
growing market power in the U.S. economy).
124. See BAKER, supra note 123 (manuscript at 9-41); Baker, supra note 123.
125. See supra Part II.B.
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IV. CONSTITUTIONALIZING COMPETITION?
The problem of harmonizing the three public commitments that
underlie the modern economy—to economic rights, competition, and
the social safety net126—cannot be solved by constitutionalizing
those commitments. Constitutional protection to just one of the
commitments could privilege it, creating the possibility that the
courts would unduly circumscribe the other two. That nearly
happened during the nineteenth century, when the constitutional
protections for economic rights came close to inhibiting competition
policy (before Charles River Bridge) and prevented the redistribu-
tion necessary for increasingly extensive social insurance.127
Protecting all three as constitutional norms simply shifts the
problem of harmonization from the political branches to the courts.
126. See supra Part I.
127. See May, supra note 40, at 263-65.
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Nor would it be practical to protect competition constitutionally.128
Doing so would place an affirmative obligation on the federal gov-
ernment or the states to assure competitive markets. But the courts
are usually better suited to reviewing whether the political branches
have violated prohibitions than to enforcing affirmative obligations
imposed on those branches.
Were the courts to seek to interpret the Constitution to assure
competition, moreover, that would be unlikely to make much
practical difference to the way the competition commitment is
enforced. The resulting constitutional jurisprudence would probably
look like the judicial elaboration of the antitrust laws. If so, judicial
128. To the extent the Constitution protects a competition commitment today, it is in the
dormant Commerce Clause, which bars some protectionist state legislation. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3; see Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454-55 (1992) (“[W]hen [a] state statute
amounts to simple economic protectionism, a ‘virtual per se rule of invalidity’ has applied.”
(quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)). But it is hard to see how that
provision could be interpreted to mandate government assurance of competitive markets
economy-wide. But cf. Alan J. Meese, Competition Policy and the Great Depression: Lessons
Learned and a New Way Forward, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 255, 333 (2013) (advocating
an interpretation of the Dormant Commerce clause that would overrule state action
immunity). It is possible to imagine the Supreme Court expanding its protection for
commercial speech to prevent Congress or the states from limiting entry or otherwise
restricting competition. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 516 (1996)
(invalidating a state prohibition on the provision of accurate information about retail prices);
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 773 (1976)
(preventing a state from completely suppressing the dissemination of truthful information by
sellers proposing a lawful commercial transaction); cf. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S.
552, 579 (2011) (acknowledging that “the government’s legitimate interest in protecting
consumers from ‘commercial harms’ explains ‘why commercial speech can be subject to greater
governmental regulation than noncommerical speech’” in a decision finding that a state law
impermissibly restricted commercial expression). Were the Court to establish that principle,
it would not necessarily require federal or state governments to prevent private restrictions
on competition. But this possibility is merely hypothetical: protections for commercial speech
probably do not bear at all on public commitments concerning economic regulation. See Victor
Brudney, The First Amendment and Commercial Speech, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1153, 1156-58 (2012)
(arguing that First Amendment protection for commercial speech should apply only to aspects
of the expression beyond proposing the terms of transaction that would be protected if
freestanding). But see Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, The Search for an Egalitarian
First Amendment, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1953, 1971-72 (2018) (arguing that as economic activity
is increasingly imbued with communicative content, it is becoming more difficult to maintain
the distinction between economic and expressive activity). To the extent they do, moreover,
they may be better understood as recognizing economic rights than as protecting competition.
Steven C. Begakis, Rediscovering Liberty of Contract: The Unnoticed Economic Right
Contained in the Freedom of Speech, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 57, 59, 64, 90 (2017) (arguing that
commercial speech protection should be understood as establishing the liberty to form a
contract).
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enforcement of a constitutional mandate for competitive markets
would turn out to be no more protective of the competition commit-
ment than is the interpretation and enforcement of the antitrust
statutes. The national economic commitment to assuring competi-
tive markets must be protected, and antitrust enforcement needs to
be strengthened, but we should look to the political branches and
judicial interpretation of the antitrust statutes as the vehicle for
doing so, not to the Constitution.
